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CLASS ACTIONS
FROM THE PLAINTIFFS' VIEWPOINT
LEE A. FREEMAN*
N RECENT years there has been a growing awareness of abuses
practiced against small claimants; accordingly class actions
have been viewed as creatures of necessity in litigation to correct
these abuses. Through the use of the class action, these small
claimants are provided a forum and absent the class action, they
would otherwise be without a remedy. In recognition of the im-
portance of class actions, the court in Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc.,1 said:
First, since many plaintiffs only purchased small quantities of
the reinforced editions, most individual class members have little
incentive to sue alone. Their financial claims do not justify the
expense of complex antitrust litigation. . . . Only when the pur-
chases are combined in a class action is the potential damage
recovery sufficiently large to warrant litigation
Moreover, since the 1966 amendment to the class action rule,'
class actions have come of age as an effective tool in litigating the
claims of multiple party plaintiffs. It has been stated
the class action deters the robber barrons from plundering the
poor.... Taking away the class action and the joy of those who
* B.A., Syracuse University; J.D., Northwestern University; Attorney at Law,
Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Freeman is a former editor-in-chief of the JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW AND COMMERCE.
1301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2 d. at 489.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In general, the class action rule following the 1966
amendment more practically describes the proper occasions for maintaining class
actions; insures that a judgment arising out of a class action will include those
whom the court finds to be members of the class, irrespective of whether thejudgment is favorable to the class; and provides for the fair conduct of these
actions.
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live off the consumer will, as in the old days, be unconfined.'
Class action suits have realized a high degree of acceptance,
particularly in the area of private enforcement of the antitrust
laws.' This acceptance may be partly attributable to the strong
public policy repeatedly expressed by the Supreme Court of the
United States favoring private enforcement of federal antitrust
laws.
I. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AS PRIVATE ENFORCERS OF
ANTITRUST LAWS AND AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVES
Over the last ten years, the class action has developed signifi-
cantly because of the important role played by the state attorneys
general in lending weight to the private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. The genesis of the participation of state attorneys general
in antitrust suits began ten years ago when the Illinois Attorney
General first brought a treble-damage antitrust action on behalf
of 1,600 school districts separately incorporated as political sub-
divisions of the State of Illinois. The Attorney General not only
sought to combine all these school districts within Illinois, but also
effected an agreement with the neighboring states of Michigan,
Minnesota and Wisconsin to share the burdens and expenses of
the complex antitrust litigation. The four cases were ultimately
transferred to Milwaukee for cooperative pretrial discovery by
agreement of all parties. The defendants in the Illinois case attacked
the power of the Attorney General to sue on behalf of political
subdivisions, to bring federal antitrust proceedings and to act as a
class representative under the old Rule 23. Chief Judge Robson,
"Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer
Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1971).
8West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Illinois
v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Iowa v.
Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Minnesota
v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
'Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 336 (1971).
See Note, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 67 (1972). See also Leh v. General Petroleum
Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); Bruces Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
7FED. R. Civ. P. 23 as existing prior to the 1966 amendment defined the
categories of class actions in terms of the nature of the rights involved. E.g., the
"true" category was defined as involving "joint, common or secondary rights";
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after reviewing the Attorney General's constitutional and common
law powers and the resolutions adopted by many of the school
districts specifically authorizing the Attorney General to bring the
action, found that in "this unique instance" the Attorney General
was justified in filing a federal antitrust action and in acting as class
representatives for the Illinois school districts.8 Consequently, since
the Brunswick decision, the courts have consistently supported the
establishment of state-wide public agency classes with the attorney
general as the "proper representative.'"
In addition, the courts have recognized that state governments
may act as class representatives, with the attorney general as the
appropriate and competent legal representative. The legislatures
have also entered the fray by expressly authorizing state attorneys
general to institute federal treble-damage antitrust action on behalf
of governmental agencies and others in the state. Typical of the
state statutes is the Illinois Antitrust Act, which provides:
The Attorney General may bring an action on behalf of this
State, counties, municipalities, townships and other political sub-
divisions organized under the authority of this State in Federal
Court to recover damages provided for under any comparable
provision of Federal law; provided, however, this shall not impair
the authority of any such county, municipality, township or political
subdivision to bring such action on its own behalf nor impair its
authority to engage its own counsel in connection therewith.
In addition, other states have similarly authorized their respective
attorneys general to institute treble-damage federal antitrust suits
the "hybrid" category was defined as involving "several" rights related to "spe-
cific property"; and last was the "spurious" class that involved "several" rights
affected by a common question and related to common relief. See Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEO. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937).
The "spurious" action under the original Rule 23 was an anamoly in that it
was designated a class action, but did not adjudicate the rights or liabilities of
a person not a party. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966).
8 Illinois v. Brunswick Corp., 32 F.R.D. 453, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
O In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, Trade Cases (CCH) § 73,966 (D.D.C.
1972); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Minnesota
v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
'
0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 60-7.8 (1970).
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on behalf of political subdivisions." These statutes enable state
attorneys general to institute broad-based actions on behalf of all
political subdivisions specifically named as plaintiffs. To that extent,
they are not class actions, even though they involve the numerous
governmental agencies that are normally accommodated in a class
action proceeding and achieve the same purpose as a class action.
A. State-wide Consumer Actions
The acceptance of the attorneys general as the appropriate law
officers representing a state-wide class action has more recently
emerged in state-wide consumer actions. This concept of a state-
wide or city-wide class of the consuming public was first developed
in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.," which involved settlement
of a vast number of treble-damage antitrust suits charging an al-
leged price-fixing conspiracy in the sale of broad spectrum anti-
biotic drugs. In that case, settlements were achieved for (i) city-
county-state hospitals as one group, (ii) governmental agencies
that financed drug purchases by welfare recipients, (iii) retail and
wholesale druggists, and finally, (iv) the individual consumer.
The consumer fund created in the settlement of the case was
utilized to provide refunds to consumers who filed appropriate
claims after extensive publication of notice. The portion of the
consumer fund that remained after paying consumer refunds has
been set aside to finance public health projects of benefit to all the
consumers in the state or geographical area involved.
The development of these public health projects and the oppor-
tunities made available to conscientious public officials for the pro-
curement of "seed money" to finance extensive public health proj-
ects are exciting features of the broad spectrum antibiotic drug
settlement proceedings. These public health projects have been
initiated and recommended by the state attorneys general or city
legal officers, subject to approval and supervision by the district
court. Although this unique phase of the settlement plan was
attacked, nevertheless, the development of these public health proj-
ects was sustained by the Second Circuit."
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.81 (1969) (upon agreement between the at-
torney general and the political subdivision).
12 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
13440 F.2d 1079, 1091 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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The right of the states, as class representative, to bring consumer
class actions was again sustained in the broad spectrum antibiotic
litigated cases, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions" and more recently in In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation.'" In the latter decision, the district court reiterated the
determination, made in several previous private antitrust actions
instituted by state attorneys general, that these public law officers
"are the best representatives of the consumers residing within their
jurisdictions.""
B. Parens Patriae Distinguished
The position of the state as a Rule 23 class action representative
to recover for direct financial injuries must be distinguished from
attempts at private treble-damage actions on behalf of the economy,
general welfare or citizens of the state in a parens patriae capacity.
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.," the state of Hawaii brought an
antitrust complaint as parens patriae for the alleged adverse effect
on its economy of the purported antitrust violation. The Supreme
Court, in a five to two decision, rejected the parens patriae position
of Hawaii on two grounds. First, the Court held that section 4 of
the Clayton Act, which requires a showing of injury to business
or property,'8 was not broad enough in application to include in-
jury to the "general economy" of a state. Primarily, however, the
Court rejected the parens patriae status for the purpose of recovery
of damages to the general economy on the ground that the concept
"would upon the door to duplicative recoveries."19 In another court
of its complaint, Hawaii alleged a Rule 23 consumer class action,
but this allegation was dismissed by the district court. Although no
appeal was taken from the district court's ruling, the Supreme
Court, in rejecting the parens patriae concept, stressed the avail-
14333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
11Trade Cases (CCH) S 73,966 (D.D.C. 1972).
1d. at p. 92,033.
7 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
1 Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
19405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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ability of Rule 23 consumer class actions with the state being the
consumer representative." The Court stated:
Where the injury to the State occurs in its capacity as a consumer
in the marketplace, through a 'payment of money wrongfully in-
duced,' . . . damages are established by the amount of the over-
charge."
In noting the district court's dismissal on the Rule 23 class
action, the Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court did not
hold "that a state could never bring a class action on behalf of
some or all of its consumer citizens,"22 and that the respondents
had virtually conceded that consumer class actions might be ap-
propriate. Significantly, the Court stressed that class actions "are
definitely preferable in the antitrust area" to parens patriae actions
since "Rule 23 provides specific rules for delineating the appro-
priate plaintiff-class, establishes who is bound by the action, and
effectively prevents duplicative recoveries."2
This author believes that the Supreme Court in the Hawaii deci-
sion has given strong support to state-wide consumer actions insti-
tuted on behalf of the state as a consumer representative. Elsewhere
in this issue, the view is proferred that the Hawaii decision has
effectively sounded the "death knell" of the fluid class concept."
Rule 23 consumer class actions were encouraged; the manner of
calculating and measuring damages for broad consumer classes
was not considered.
II. PROBLEMS IN MANAGING THE CLASS
Before certifying a "class," the court must give consideration to
the "difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action" in reaching its finding that the issues common to the
class predominate and that the class action is superior to other
available methods of adjudicating the controversy." This require-
ment imposes upon the court the need to consider procedural prob-
lems that may be encountered if a class action is established.
2Old. at 266.
21 Id. at 262 n.14.
22 d. at 266.
23 Id.
24 See the article by Mr. Blechman in this issue.
2 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
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A. Manageability
The manageability questions in the establishment of class actions
has arisen principally when consumer groups have been involved.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,' a class action involving some
six million purchasers of odd-lot securities was sustained. While in
City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Company,7 a class action
involving retail consumers of gasoline in the three states of Dela-
ware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania was rejected. The size of the
class was not determinative; instead, the manageability issue re-
volved around the proper identification of the class members and
the ability to establish purchase transactions by the proposed mem-
bers of the class. In the American Oil case, the district court recog-
nized that the consumer class members would be impossible to
identify because of their changing character from day to day, the
absence of purchase records and the extreme complexity of gasoline
marketing. The better view appears to be that an established,
identifiable and relatively stable group of consumer class members,
no matter what their numerical size, will satisfy the manageability
issue. 8
B. Notice
The question of the form of class suit notice after a class has
been established is of primary importance. Rule 23 requires a
neutral form of notice."' The defendants, of course, have persist-
2641 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
27 53 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Con-
sumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1971).
2Courts are required by virtue of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) to give notice
in 23(b)(3) class actions. Rule 23(c)(2) provides: "In any class action main-
tained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class
if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel." In all other forms of class actions, the notice requirements is dis-
cretionary with the court. Rule 23(d) (2) provides in part: "In the conduct of
actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: .. .
(2) requiring for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of their members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
1972]
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ently sought to include in a class suit notice such elements as (i) a
warning of discovery burdens that might be imposed on class
members, or (ii) the prospect of the sharing of costs and expenses."
These elements have been advocated to reduce class member par-
ticipation. An additional element in notices that has been ac-
cepted by some of the district courts requires that class members
file claims or estimates of claims as an affirmative requirement of
their participation in the class."
This author believes that this notice requirement unbalances the
notice in favor of the defendants and goes beyond the requirements
and terms of Rule 23. Judge Edenfield in the Northern District of
Georgia recently rejected the defendants' request that class mem-
bers affirmatively indicate their intentions to prove damages as
being contrary to the literal terms of Rule 23.32 Judge Fullam,
writing elsewhere in this issue, has favored what he calls a "show
of hands" by potential class members.' A class suit, however, should
permit participation of all defined class members who do not opt-
out or indicate their desire to be specially represented. Actually,
automatic participation of all other class members is necessary to
assure complete resolution of all issues being litigated. Further-
more, the threatened burden suggested in class suit notices, if a
member participates, creates imaginary problems for the timid, un-
informed and often overworked purchasing agent, financial officer
or lower echelon government employee, which most often results
in unwarranted negative attitudes.
Consequently, the neutrality of a class suit notice is lost. More-
over, as a practical matter, it is frequently impossible for individual
class members to determine the harm they have suffered from an
antitrust conspiracy without the advice and guidance of the attorney
for the class representative.
Rule 23 requires that "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances" be utilized. In the past, mailed notices to members
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action ...."
"
0 The Cast Iron Pipe Antitrust Cases, Civil No. 71-516 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
31 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
32 Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., Trade Cases (CCH) § 73,946 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
13 See the article by Judge Fullam in this issue.
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who can be reasonably identified and publication to broader classes
or a combination of both have been employed. The selection of the
appropriate notice is left largely to the discretion of the district
judge. In considering the practicability of the notice provided, the
judge must necessarily give attention to the costs and expenses
involved. Frequently, the use of advanced computer techniques can
substantially reduce these costs. Certainly this is true where repeated
notices and contacts may have to be made with class members. In
those cases an accumulation of data can be stored on the computer
which can be quickly, economically and repeatedly retrieved at
subsequent stages in the proceedings.
C. Pretrial Discovery
Frequently, defendants have directed detailed and massive dis-
covery requests and interrogatories against class members. The
apparent purpose of this technique has been to so burden many
small class members to eliminate their participation. Some courts
have recognized this motivation and have rejected the defendants'
discovery requests, especially in areas in which the defendants
themselves have relatively complete and accessible records from
which they could prepare full answers.'
The issue presented by these defendant discovery demands
against class members requires a balancing of convenience, a
showing by the defendants of direct relevance to the principle issues
in the case and the necessity of proceeding in this manner rather
than in more convenient ways. The more popular position of
judges administering complex class actions is that the common is-
sues of the class action should be, and are, best explored with the
representative parties. This is the very basis upon which class
actions have been encouraged. These common issues frequently
involve all of the liability questions. Only after liability discovery
has been completed or liability separately established at trial, are
individual class members required to supply support for their
claim of damages.
D. Damages
The manner of determining and calculating damages in large
IIllinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 301 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D. I1.
1969).
19721
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class actions has been the subject of recent decisions.' In addition,
the determination of damages presents opportunities for use of the
imagination and daring of counsel and the courts."6 For example,
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,37 the district court held that dam-
ages could be computed for the total injury to the class without
each individual filing a separate claim. Distribution could then be
made on an equitable basis among class members. The availability
of gross sales figures and certain industry studies of the defendants
provided a basis for reliable calculations of aggregate transactions
from which total damages could be determined.
In the litigated antibiotic-antitrust actions, 8 Judge Miles Lord
approved a procedure whereby the total amount of damages on a
class-wide basis for millions of consumers would be determined by
statistical means in separate proceedings after the liability trial.
The use of both established statistical procedures and economic
analysis to establish the total purchases by class members and the
average price differential caused by the conspiratorial actions has
been gaining acceptance." In contrast is the position of the defend-
ants favoring an individual purchase-by-purchase determination of
damages.
The complexities of the damage problems can be met by a bi-
furcated procedure; first having the liability issue determined and
15Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); lit re Co-
ordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3 6 See Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Un-
der Federal Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972) and Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 497, 499 (1969).
3752 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333
F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
36Miller, supra note 36, at 512-13 concludes: "Accordingly, a federal court
should feel free to experiment in awarding relief under rule 23. It has the tools
to shape the remedy to meet the exigencies of each case and difficulties in ad-
ministration should not be allowed to destroy the usefulness of the class action
procedure. . . . Class actions under rule 23(b)(3) pose many new challenges to
the federal courts that must be met with flexibility and imagination. Fortunately,
the amended rule gives them numerous tools with which to administer and ex-
pedite large cases that otherwise might well prove unmanageable if the court
were obliged to follow a more rigid and less fluid procedural structure. If prop-
erly utilized, it may well be that Rule 23, for all of its complexity and the many
questions its text leaves unanswered, will prove to be a key building block in the
federal courts' continuing effort to make our procedural system responsive to
the needs of contemporary society."
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then separately proceeding to the damage problem. This could be
accomplished either with a single jury, two separate juries or the
appointment of a special master to determine the amount of dam-
ages and report to a jury-all without infringing upon the right of
trial by jury.
A likely solution to the complexity and manageability problems
inherent in the determination of damages for large classes of plain-
tiffs would be the use of special masters in jury trials. Rule 53(b)
contemplates the use of a special master in civil jury trials; the
Supreme Court has approved and commended reference to a spe-
cial master in jury, as well as non-jury cases "where accounts are
complex and intrincate, or the documents and other evidence vol-
uminous, or where extensive computations are to be made.""0 As
Justice Clark observed in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.,"1 the need
to conserve judicial resources in a jury case may require the use
of a special master:
We agree that the detailed accounting required in order to deter-
mine the damages suffered by each plaintiff might be referred to
a master after the court has determined the overall liability of
defendants, provided the circumstances indicate that the use of the
court's time is not warranted in receiving proof and making the
tabulation.'
In addition, there is much precedence approving the use of a special
master in civil jury actions involving numerous transactions and
voluminous records."
The special master could be appointed after the determination of
the liability issue. He would have nothing to do with supervising
discovery or dealing with discovery issues, but instead his function
would be to conduct hearings and receive evidence on the detailed,
tedious issues involved in the calculation of the quantum of dam-
ages to individual class members. This approach follows the pro-
4 0 Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 313 (1920).
41352 U.S. 249 (1957).
4ld. at 259.
1 Burgess v. Williams, 302 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1962); Graffis v. Woodward,
96 F.2d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 631 (1938); Connecticut
Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn.
1940); Newcomb v. Universal Match Corp., 25 F. Supp. 169, 172 (E.D.N.Y.
1938); United States v. Wilson, 21 F.R.D. 173, 174 (N.D. Tex. 1957); Ber-
covici v. Chaplin, 3 F.R.D. 409, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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cedure approved by Judge Murrah in Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Nisely." When the special master has completed his pro-
ceedings, he would submit his findings to the court in written form.
The court would then have the opportunity to rule upon any
objections, and as modified by the ruling, the report would con-
stitute prima facie evidence for the jury's consideration.' Hopefully,
this suggested procedure for the use of a special master may obvi-
ate some of the problems that have been raised in criticism of the
pursuit of a single damage recovery for the class that would be
distributed in subsequent proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
At this juncture, the concept of class actions under Rule 23 is
in its development stages. Moreover, many significant and vital
problems remain. This article has focused on selected problems
in the area of class actions and is not intended as an exhaustive
treatment. But constructive solutions to these selected problems, as
well as other problems in the class action field can be reached with
the ingenuity of the courts and counsel.
-"300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962).
"Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 311 (1920); Charles A. Wright, Inc. v.
F.D. Rich Co., 354 F.2d 710 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966);
Burgess v. Williams, 302 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1962); Connecticut Importing Co.
v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940).
